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CASES NOTED
in the decisions emphasizes the high regard with which the courts look
upon these civil liberties.
The wide variance of opinion as to the specific freedom of speech vio-
lated and the true resultant evil to be avoided demonstrates the difficulty
of applying the clear and present danger test to the situation. The require-
ment that an oath be taken setting forth the affiliations and beliefs of the
individual is perhaps a violation of a freedom of silence rather than of
speech. It has been suggested that such a liberty is protected by the Fifth
Amendment rather than by the First.' 4
It is the contention of the National Labor Relations Board that Con-
gress has afforded a facility for the unions, the privilege of becoming an
exclusive bargaining agent, and that § 9(h) is merely a condition to qualify
the recipient of the favor.' 5 It is true there have been many situations in
which Congress has been upheld in its power to condition the utilization
of facilities afforded upon compliance with certain conditions, as in the
use of the mails.16 However, the Fifth Amendment guards against the im-
position of arbitrary and discriminatory conditions.17  The question then
becomes a matter of whether the requirement established by Congress that
the affidavits be furnished is reasonably calculated to accomplish the pro.
tection of interstate commerce from political strikes without imposing an
extremely unfair burden on particular individuals or groups.
Congress decided the means selected would best accomplish this end
when it amended the National Labor Relations Act. In deciding that § 9(h)
does not violate the Constitution, the Court affirmed the findings of Con-
gress and refused to substitute its judgment as to the necessity of such re-
strictions. There is danger that, unless the decision of the Court be re-
stricted very narrowly to the specific situation involved, it could prove a
precedent for permitting Congress to infringe upon First Amendment rights
indirectly and gradually diminish individual liberties.
CONTRACTS - ASSIGNMENT OF WARRANTY - QUANTITY
A vendor of whiskey in storage gave to the original vendee a warranty,
against excess loss in quantity,' which was assigned to the sub-purchaser
in a general sale of assets. Held, the sub-purchaser, as assignee, can enforce
the warranty of quantity against the original vendor, though there is no
14. See Nutting, Freedom of Silence, 47 Micu. L. REV. 181, 219 (1948).
15. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 8, at 679.
16. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Lewis Publishing
Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
17. cf. Walling v. Sun Publishing Co., 47 F. Supp. 180, 191 (W.D. Tenn. 1942).
1. The warranty was against excess outage. Outage is loss of content from seepage,
evaporation or whatever the cause. Excess outage is all outage beyond that allowed by
the Government for tax computation purposes. Hunter-Wilson Distilling Co. v. Foust
Distilling Co., 181 F.2d 543, 544 (3d Cir. 1950).
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privity of contract. Hunter-Wilson Distilling Co., 181 l7.2d 543 (3d Cir.
1950).
The general rule is that the mere resale of a warranted article does not
transfer to the sub-purchaser any rights under an original warranty.2 Not
only does the warranty not flow with the goods3 as a result of the sale, but
it cannot be assigned as a contract right. The legal bar to an attempted
assignment of a warranty is the lack of privity,4 a modern heritage from
the early common law which denied the right to assign a chose in action
arising out of any contract. Assignment of rights in contracts was denied
because of tle personal nature of contracts in general,0 formed by promises
madc with the personality and character of the promisee as an important
factor. However, in time, it became recognized that the importance of the
personal consideration in inducing the promise was, and is, a matter of
degree.' Consequently, rights arising out of a contract, in which the per-
sonal consideration is inconsequential, may be assigned to a stranger by an
original promisee.
\Varranties, however; as contracts, 'have zemained an exception and gen-
erally arc not assignable.8 The reason lies in the history of the action and
not in logic. Early actions on warranties were brought in deceit," but with
the growth of assumpsit," the suits shifted to the latter action" because
proof of scicnter was eliminated and relief was easier.'2 A sub-purchaser,
however, was without relief since an assignment of a warranty, like other
contracts, was not permitted because of the lack of privity. With the
growth of action on the case and modern negligence actions, suits for dam-
ages resulting from the purchase of defective articles again shifted to tort.'
3
Original purchasers could successfully maintain actions in tort,'4 but the
defense of lack of privity, which originated in assumpsit and had some
foundation in logic as a bar to assignment, was carried over as a defense
against a sub-purchaser who alleged negligence.' 5 It was not until after the
2. 4 \\'ILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 998 (Rev. ed. 1936).
3. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7 Cir. 1937).
4. Farlow v. Jeffcoat, 78 Ga. App. 653, 52 S.E.2d 30 (1949).
5. lillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 152 N.W. 265 (1915); 2
'ATr.LISTON, CON''RACIS § 405 (Rev. ed. 1936).
6. Atlantic & C. N. R.R. v, Atlantic & N. C. Co., 1-97 N.C. 368, 61 S.E. 185 (1908).
/. Garford Motor Truck Co. v. Buckson, 4 Hairr. 103, 143 Atl. 410 (1927); Parker
. kasley, 40 N.M. 68, 54 P.2d 687 (1936).
8. 4 WILLiSION, CONFIRtACIS § 998 (Rev. ed. 1936).
9. 3 1IOLDSWOR'rll, lIsToRY oi, ENGLIst LAw 428 434 (4th Ed. 1935).
10. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18 (Mich. 1779).
I1. Ames, History of Asswtmpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1889).
12. Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446 (K.B. 1802),
13. Aries, tura note I.
1-1. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.'Deselmns, 212 U.S. 159 (1909); Ebbert v. Philadelphia
Vice. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 At]. 323 (1934); Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah 588, 150 Pac.
56 (1915).
15. It was feared that industry would be impeded by subjectiug a supplier of chat-
tels to multiplicity of actions in scattered localities, Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &
WN. 1019, fEx. 1842), and later because the injury to third parties could not be a fore-
\cCIlV consequence liuset v. 1. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir.
1903).
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case of McPherson v. Buick 8 that lack of privity could be eliminated as a
defense against a sub-purchaser of any article.1" As a result, many warranty
cases now are brought as negligence actions, and breach of warranty and
negligence in manufacture are almost interchangeable concepts. 18
Pure breach of warranty has not followed the development of either
eliminating lack of privity in negligence,19 or liberalizing the right of as-
signments in contracts in which the personal consideration is inconsequential.
On the contrary, contracts of warranty,' as a group, are construed as highly
personal and are not assignable.2 0 Individual warranties are not examined
for the true degree of personal consideration, unlike other contracts, but
are personal by dint of being warranties. There are exceptions of warranties
which do flow with the resale of the goods. Sub-purchasers of food and of
inherently dangerous instrumentalities have been allowed recovery againqt
the original vendors.2' This closelv parallels the negligence cases before
McPherson v. Buick, and in some of the jurisdictions allowing these ex-
ceptions there is a trend to extend the right to other articles.
22
A sub-purchaser who has been allowed an action on breach of warranty
must spell it out and define its terms. There is always a warranty of quality
and title if there is a warranty at all. There may be an express warranty2-
or a warranty implied in law from the sale alone.24 There may also be a
warranty construed from the acts and words of the seller in his inducements
to the buyer. 25 A description of quality in an express warranty may be de-
tailed, but may be an implied warranty created from custom, usage and
good sense. Because other defects, such as short shipments, incorrect colors
16. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
17. Dillon v. William S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Super. 365. 64 A.2d 525 (1949).
18. 1-ruska v. Parke. Davis Co., 6 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925): Marler v. Pearlman's
R.R. Salvage Co., 230 N.C. 121, 52 S.E.2d 3 (1949): Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Louder, 207 S.W. 2d 632 (Tex. 1948): Jacob E. Decker & Sons v, Capps, 139 Te,
609, 164 S.X. 2d 828 (1942); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1932), on rehearing, 179 \Wash 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934); see PRossR, TORTs § 85,
707 (1941).
19. Dillon v. William S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Super. 365, 64 A.2d 525 (1949.)
20. Farlow v. Jeffcoat, 78 Ga. App. 653, 52 S.E.2d 30 (1949).
21. Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co, 67 F. Supp. 751, (W.D. La. 1946):
Patorgias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Il. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1948):
Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Louder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1948): Jacob F.
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609. 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 168 Wash. 456. 12 P.2d 409 (1932); Mazetti v. Armour Co., 75 Wash. 622. 135
Pac 633 (1913). Contra Barucki v. Mackenzie Bros. Co. 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224
(1939); Smith v, Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 NH. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942);
Salano v. First Nat. Stores, 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1945).
22. Raymond v. J. R. Watkins Co., 88 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1950) (shampoo):
Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App.2d 933, 197 P,2d 854 (1948) (soap), Ehers v. Cctwr i
Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945) (tree spray).
23. Orrison v. Ferrante, 72 A.2d 771 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1950).
24. Mazetti v. Armour Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
25. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942):
Fleenor v Erickson, 215 P.2d 885 (1950); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 4;6,
12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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or incorrect sizes are of the heart of the sales contract, they need not be
warranted, and there is simply a breach of contract.
26
In the instant case, there was an express warranty covering excess loss
in quantity, which is rare, but exists as a custom in the alcoholic beverage
trade. If the warranty were treated as any other contract, it could be as-
signed, since there was no personal consideration. The whiskey stored in
a warehouse was untouched and unseen by the purchaser, and would have
been warranted to any vendee. Yet, because of the treatment of the assign-
ment of warranfies as different from other contracts, the court could not
examine this contract and call it assignable. Instead, it allowed assignment
on the basis of a distinction of this warranty of quantity from the usual
one of quality and title. If the court were faced with a situation in which
a warranty was clearly of quality and was equally as impersonal as this one,
it is uncertain whether assignment would be permitted. But the decision
does show a dissatisfaction with the practice of grouping warranties and
classifying them as unassignable. It also shows an inclination to examine
the individual warranty for its own terms and to consider it on its own
merits. This attitude is much more in keeping with the needs of a complex
modern business structure than is a rigid rule of lack of privity based in
antiquity and illogically perpetuated.
EMINENT DOMAIN - JUST COMPENSATION - COST
OF REMOVAL OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
The United States expropriated, for a term of years with an option to
renew, a warehouse leased by the defendants. The period originally con-
demned by the government would have expired before the termination of
the leasehold, but the government, by exercising its option, exhausted the
leasehold. The cost of removal of personal property was included in the
just compensation award of the lower federal courts. Held, that the market
rental value would not include the cost of removal of personal property,
when the exercise of the renewal option exhausted a leasehold which orig-
inally was not entirely condemned. United States v. Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 644 (1950).
The Government may condemn property for a term of years, or for
an indefinite number of years,2 by condemning with an option to lengthen
or shorten the initial expropriation. When an option is, or is not, exercised
26. But see Abounader v. Strohmyer & Orpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309
(1926).
1. US. CONST. AMEND. V; 56 STAT. 177 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. 632 (1946);
see United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
2. United States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); see United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 55 F. Supp. 257 (D.C. Md. 1944).
